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Abstract. Although the concept of dignity is commonly invoked in clinical care, there is not widespread agreement—in either the academic literature or in everyday clinical conversations—about what dignity means.
Without a framework for understanding dignity, it is difficult to determine what threatens patients’ dignity and,
conversely, how to honor commitments to protect and promote it. This article aims to change that by offering
the first conceptual model of dignity for patients in the intensive care unit. The conceptual model we present is
based on the notion that there are three sources of patients’ dignity—their shared humanity, personal narratives,
and autonomy—each of which independently warrants respect. The article describes each source of dignity
and draws on examples to illustrate how clinician attitudes, actions, and behaviors can either contribute to, or
detract from, expressions of respect for patient dignity.
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D

ignity is a commonly invoked, but rarely
defined, concept in clinical care. Hospital
brochures and Patients’ Bills of Rights
inform patients that they have a right to be treated
with dignity (Johns Hopkins Medicine, 2013),
professional codes increasingly direct clinicians to
provide dignified care (American Medical Association, 2012–2013; International Council of Nurses,
2012), and patients in a variety of clinical settings
report that receiving dignity–preserving care is
important to them (Chochinov, Hack, McClement,
Kristjanson, & Harlos, 2002). At the same time, a

growing number of studies have concluded that
as many as one–half of all hospitalized patients
experience “a loss of dignity” during interactions
with the health care system (Gordon and Betty
Moore Foundation, 2012), a risk that is heightened
for patients in intensive care settings (Baillie, 2009;
Turnock & Kelleher, 2001).
Despite dignity’s presence in the clinical lexicon,
there is not widespread agreement—in either the
academic literature or in everyday clinical conversations—about what dignity means (Gallagher,
2011). On some accounts, dignity is primarily, if not
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exclusively, about respecting patients’ autonomy
(Pinker, 2008; Macklin, 2003). On other accounts,
respecting patients’ dignity involves attention to a
constellation of factors, including patients’ medical
fears and anxieties, bodily privacy, cultural and
religious differences, and relationships with others
(Chochinov, 2002). Without a common framework
for understanding dignity, it is difficult to determine
what threatens patients’ dignity and, conversely, how
to honor commitments to protect and promote it.
As part of a larger project aimed at eliminating
preventable harms to patients in intensive care
units (ICUs), the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation included “loss of dignity” as a previously
overlooked and “unrecognized harm” to patients
(Adamy, 2012; Sugarman, 2015). Unlike traditional
clinical harms (such as hospital–based infections
or surgical complications), which can be measured
and addressed using standardized criteria and
treatment regimens, harms to patients’ dignity are
more difficult to identify and rectify in part because
we lack a conceptual lens through which to view
and correct them.1 To fill that void, and ultimately
improve the care that patients in ICUs receive, we
embarked on a project to conceptualize respect and
dignity as they relate to patients in that setting.
The conceptual model that we offer, which is
based on our review of the philosophical and clinical literature on respect and dignity, is focused on
understanding the sources of, and ensuring respect
for, the dignity of patients, regardless of age or level
of consciousness. In this article, we focus on the
model’s application to adult patients in the ICU.
There are particular and important nuances of this
framework when applied to infants and children,
and to adults in other clinical settings, that we
do not address herein. It is equally important to
consider how to ensure respect for the dignity of
clinicians and patients’ loved ones in the ICU, but
we reserve those questions for a later date.

1. Some qualitative data about dignity–related harms have
been gathered. See Chochinov, Hack, Hassard, et al. (2002)
and Chochinov (2002).

In this article, we claim that respect is owed to
ICU patients because they possess dignity. Respect
is an attitude, behavior, or feeling toward an entity
that conveys proper regard or consideration for that
entity,2 in this case, patients in the ICU. Dignity—
derived from the Latin word dignus, meaning worthy—is a multifaceted concept that both signifies a
patient’s moral worth and grounds an obligation
to respect the patient.
We contend that patient dignity is grounded
in three characteristics of patients, each of which
independently warrants respect. The first source of
patient dignity, and the one that all patients possess
equally and absolutely regardless of age or level of
consciousness, is shared humanity. Shared humanity
is an immutable feature of persons that cannot be
taken away or diminished. It requires a baseline level
of respect for patients as human beings, regardless
of any specific characteristics they may or may not
possess. Beyond shared humanity are two additional
sources of dignity that are unique to each patient
and that ICU patients may express and experience to
varying degrees. These sources of dignity, which also
warrant respect, are patients’ personal narratives and
their actual or potential autonomy. Patients’ personal
narratives include, among other things, their familial
and societal roles, relationships with others, likes
and dislikes, religious views, and lived experiences.
Patients’ autonomy encompasses making choices
that allow them to live a life based on their distinctive
values, preferences, and plans. In the case of infants
and children, we respect their emerging capacities for
autonomous choice and relational potential.
Although the model distinguishes among the
three dignity–generating features of patients—shared

2. Respect has been understood in other ways as well, for
example, as a principle (Frankena, 1986). Respect is entity
generated, meaning that it is not driven by the interests or
desires of the person respecting the entity, but rather by some
feature of the entity itself. Accordingly, we may not like a
particular entity, but we may still have a duty to respect it
because the entity possesses moral significance independent
of us (Dillon, 2014).
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humanity, personal narrative, and autonomy—the
model also acknowledges that these sources of dignity, and the respect they demand, at times intersect
(Figure 1). Patients’ personal narratives, for example,
frequently influence the health care decisions they
make as autonomous individuals. To respect both
sources of patients’ dignity, clinicians can adopt a
nonjudgmental and accepting attitude toward each
patient, even when patients’ values and choices conflict with clinicians’ beliefs and recommendations.
In the ensuing discussion, we describe each source
of dignity and draw on examples to illustrate how
clinician attitudes, actions, and behaviors can either
contribute to, or detract from, expressions of respect
for patient dignity.
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Shared Humanity
All patients, and indeed all people, possess dignity simply by virtue of being human. There is a
theological basis for this view, in which humans
derive their dignity from their creation in God’s
image (Barilan, 2009; Shultziner, 2006; Torrance,
1988), and there is a secular version, in which
humans derive dignity from their shared humanity (Margalit, 2007). On both interpretations, all
human beings possess dignity intrinsically and
equally (Meyer, 1989). Whether old or young,
wealthy or poor, Nobel laureate or trash collector,
individuals are entitled to be treated with equal
respect for their dignity befitting their value as
human beings.

Figure 1. Three Sources of Patient Dignity that Warrant Respect
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Shared humanity is the first and central source of
dignity in the conceptual model we propose because
it applies to all patients, regardless of any specific
qualities they may or may not have (Gewirth, 1992;
Kolnai, 1995; Nordenfelt, 2004; Spielberg, 1970). A
patient in a persistent vegetative state, for example,
who may lack the biological, cognitive, and relational capacities that we commonly associate with
persons, nevertheless possesses this form of dignity.
By contrast, the two other sources of dignity in the
model are contingent: Whether someone has a personal narrative upon which they can reflect (or that
is otherwise discernable), and whether someone
can exercise their autonomy, are capacities that may
wax and wane across their disease trajectory. Some
patients may have both capacities; other patients
may have neither. By focusing first on the source of
dignity that patients universally and unconditionally possess, the model imposes a baseline level of
respect for all patients.
There are a variety of ways in which care in an
ICU can be respectful of this fundamental aspect
of patients’ dignity. First, clinicians and health
care institutions can take steps to acknowledge
each patient as having equal moral worth. This
requires treating all patients with the same baseline level of respect, regardless of their diagnoses,
lifestyle choices, actions, attitudes, socioeconomic
status, age, gender, race, religion, or culture (Beach,
Roter, Wang, Duggan, & Cooper, 2006). It means,
for example, applying resources and treatments
equally to patients who are homeless and those
who are financially privileged. It means speaking as
respectfully to patients who are not adherent to their
treatment as those who are. It means showing the
same regard for patients who have substance abuse
addictions as those who do not. When clinicians or
institutions treat some patients as less worthy—not
only of their care, but also of their attention and
compassion (Blanchard & Lurie, 2004)—they disrespect the universal dignity that all patients share.
Second, clinicians should enter each patient
interaction with the presumption that every patient
deserves to be respected as a human being. Even
when a patient’s medical status—for example,
deep sedation or unconsciousness—suggests that
the patient is likely unaware of how others are

treating him or her, clinicians should err on the
side of treating the patient with the same respect
owed any other patient. This bright line rule not
only removes any ambiguity about which patients
are owed respect as human beings (all are), it also
reinforces the notion that the dignity derived from
patients’ shared humanity requires clinicians to
treat all patients with the same baseline level of
respect.
Respecting the dignity of patients as human
beings begins with not objectifying them. When clinicians refer to patients by name, look them in the eye,
introduce themselves, and describe the care they are
providing, they treat patients as people rather than
objects. By contrast, when patients are labeled by
their diagnosis, referred to by their room number, or
discussed in the third person—even when they are
not aware of being objectified in this way—they are
not treated with the respect owed to human beings.
Patients are similarly objectified when clinicians fail
to recognize them at all. This can occur when patients
are subjected to an examination without permission
or explanation; when procedures are performed
on them in an indifferent, rote, or distracted way;
or when one clinician speaks to another about the
patient as if the patient were not there.
As human beings with shared dignity, patients
also are owed respect for their bodily and physical
privacy. Unlike objects, people have expectations
of privacy, and they experience feelings of vulnerability, shame, and humiliation. Even when
patients’ medical status precludes them from
experiencing these emotions, their shared humanity requires attention to their bodily privacy. During the course of receiving care, ICU patients are
stripped of their clothing and belongings, and they
are dressed in hospital gowns in which they may
feel physically exposed. Their intimate bodily care,
including washing and toileting, may necessitate
assistance from others, sometimes of the opposite
sex. Patients’ medical treatment may require them
to be uncovered and touched by strangers in ways
that interfere with space they consider personal.
Their door or curtain may be left open for others
to peer in. Collectively, these intrusions can pose
challenges to patients’ sense of dignity (Matiti &
Trorey, 2004).
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Clinicians can navigate these privacy boundaries
with sensitivity and respect for the patient’s moral
worth as a human being. As a first step, clinicians
might think of the patient’s hospital room or bed
space as the patient’s private space. Clinicians
should introduce themselves upon entering the
patient’s space and explain why they are there.
These actions signal respect for the patient’s physical privacy, while also creating a setting in which
more intimate examinations or procedures can
take place. When clinicians must undress or touch
a patient’s body for an examination or procedure,
they should discuss what is about to take place
with the patient in a manner consistent with the
patient’s capacity for understanding and conveying
a choice. In cases in which the patient has the capacity to understand and respond, clinicians should
ask permission before uncovering or manipulating
the patient’s body. For example, a clinician might
say, “I need to listen to your heart and lungs now.
Is that okay? You will feel the stethoscope on your
chest as I listen.” When the patient lacks capacity
or awareness, clinicians should nevertheless respect
the patient’s bodily privacy by informing the patient
of their intent. The clinician might say, for example,
“I am going to change the bandage over your IV. You
will feel a pull on your skin as I remove the tape,
and it will feel cool as I cleanse the area. You may
feel pressure as I replace the bandage.” Clinicians
can further communicate respect for the patient’s
bodily privacy, and thus her or his dignity, by closing the door or drawing curtains around the bed
(where available), and redraping the patient when
any procedure is complete.

Personal Narrative
Unlike shared humanity, which patients possess
universally and absolutely, the extent to which
patients have and can reflect upon a personal narrative is contingent and may wax or wane during
the course of a patient’s illness. Most patients have
a unique biographical story, even if they do not currently have the capacity to share or reflect upon it.
Having a personal narrative is a characteristic frequently associated with possessing human dignity.
Some philosophers refer to this feature of humans
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as generating a “dignity of identity” (Nordenfelt,
2004, p. 74), whereas others describe it as a dignity
of biographical “uniqueness” (Rolston, 2008). This
source of dignity demands respect for people who
have created, invested in, and internalized a personal narrative—one in which their family role,
societal role, likes and dislikes, religious preferences, worldview, and lived experiences, among
other things—make them uniquely who they are.
At its core, respecting this source of dignity is about
respecting individuals’ perceptions of themselves
and what matters to them.
When people are hospitalized, they frequently
experience a shift in their personal narrative.
Often that shift involves a transition from being
a healthy, able–bodied person to a critically ill,
dependent patient (Coventry, 2006; van Gennip,
Pasman, Oosterveld–Vlug, Willems, & Onwuteaka–
Philipsen, 2013). A growing number of empirical
studies have demonstrated that, in these situations,
patients measure their dignity by the degree to
which their personal identity remains intact during
medical treatment and the extent to which they are
able to adapt their personal narrative to alterations
imposed by their disease or treatment (Coventry,
2006; Matiti & Trorey, 2004; van Gennip et al., 2013).
Relevant factors in patients’ assessments often
include whether they can continue to function in
their previous roles, whether they can control their
behavior, and whether their bodies remain recognizable to them. The inability to do any one of these
things is commonly accompanied by feelings that
one’s dignity has been diminished.
In the ICU, respecting a patient’s personal narrative begins with clinicians’ openness to discovering the uniqueness of each patient. How does the
patient perceive herself and her identity? What
roles and relationships (familial, professional, or
community based) are meaningful to her? Does
she define herself by a commitment to any cultural,
religious, or other values? Are there any aspects of
the patient’s self–image that may be particularly
challenged by a hospital environment? For example,
what are the patient’s norms around modesty?
Is appearance especially important to her? Is she
typically formal in her interactions with strangers? What are her fears and concerns about her
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hospitalization and illness? If the patient is sedated
or unconscious, who was she before she became ill?
Understanding how a patient perceives these
dimensions of her identity is the first step in providing care that is respectful of this aspect of her
dignity. Establishing who a patient is and what it is
about her life, as she has lived it so far, that matters
to her is a critical next step—not only because that
knowledge may inform a medical decision, but also
because it can help clinicians to provide care that is
respectful of the unique person they are treating.
Personal narratives can help clinicians to view their
patient not only as the person they now see, but also
as an accumulation of the person that the patient was
before her hospital admission. For example, including questions about the patient’s personal narrative
in routine assessment tools and constructing a space
where pictures of people central to the patient’s life
can be displayed are ways to “re–personalize” ICU
care. Just as the personal narrative of a woman who
loses her only child is always inclusive of her being
a mother, a patient’s personal narrative before her
hospitalization may be central to her, even if she
cannot return to it after her illness.
Once clinicians have developed an understanding of a patient as a particular person, they can
provide care that acknowledges and supports that
patient’s identity. In this context, respecting the
patient’s dignity requires treating the patient as a
particular person. When health care providers treat
patients with the same diagnosis with equal regard,
but fail to address each patient’s discrete needs, they
may respect the dignity related to patients’ shared
humanity, but disrespect the dignity connected to
each patient’s personal narrative. This can result in
treating a patient’s narrow health problem, while
ignoring his general well–being.
Respectful care, therefore, requires making
efforts to “meet patients where they are.” When
clinicians address patients by name—referring to
patients who express a preference for formality by
their title and last name (e.g., “Mr. Smith”), and
to patients who prefer a more casual approach
by their first name—they signal respect for the
individual patient before them. Discussions about
treatment options should be similarly sensitive to
each patient’s desires, fears, and values, including

any religious and cultural beliefs that may impact
individual health care decisions. For example,
patients may have religious beliefs about the sanctity of human life that inform their decision making
about certain medical options near the end of life.
Clinicians may not always agree with or understand
a patient’s values, but openness to them is a crucial
part of respecting the patient’s personal narrative,
and as we discuss, it is also a necessary step in
respecting their autonomy.
Clinicians can also respect patients’ personal
narratives by facilitating “role preservation.”
(Chochinov, 2002; McClement, Chochinov, Hack,
Kristjanson, & Harlos, 2004). This involves encouraging patients to engage in their personal, professional, and societal roles and relationships to the
extent possible within the constraints imposed
by their illness and the hospital setting. Even
when a patient’s identity has been temporarily or
permanently altered by their disease, accident, or
treatments, clinicians can demonstrate respect for a
patient’s current and previous narrative by inviting
the patient’s loved ones to connect to the patient
through the roles they have played in the patient’s
life. For unconscious or sedated patients, clinicians
can express respect for the patient’s personal, professional, and societal roles by asking the patient’s
loved ones to bring in pictures or other artifacts that
they believe the patient would find meaningful and
familiar in the midst of unfamiliar surroundings.
The benefits of these actions are twofold: clinicians
can demonstrate that they appreciate who patients
are, apart from their illnesses, and an opportunity
is given to express ways in which patients’ “selves”
remain intact despite their time in the ICU.
Finally, respecting patients’ personal narratives
means helping them maintain their pride, or their
perception of their own worth (Chochinov, 2002;
Matiti & Trorey, 2004; McClement et al., 2004). Patients
in the ICU frequently experience challenges to their
self–image. A patient who associates his identity with
being well–groomed and conservatively dressed, for
example, may not take pride in (or even recognize)
himself when his hair is not brushed and his hospital
gown does not completely cover his body. Similarly,
a patient who defines her identity in large part by
her ability to remain composed in stressful situations
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may not feel “like herself” when her illness makes
her outwardly emotional or her medication affects
her impulse control. Although these circumstances
can also affect how others view the patient, what
matters here is that they confound the patient’s
personal narrative as constructed and evaluated
by her. When clinicians inquire about how patients
perceive themselves, and take steps to help patients
to maintain that self–image, they safeguard a critical
aspect of patients’ dignity.

Autonomy
As our discussion of shared humanity and personal narratives demonstrates, there are significant steps that can and should be undertaken to
respect patients’ dignity in the ICU, even before
reaching the more frequently considered issue of
autonomy. Nevertheless, the aspect of dignity that
has received the most attention in the bioethical
literature—both positive and negative—relates to
individuals’ capacity for autonomy. Kant (2005) was
the first philosopher to provide a thorough account
of this view of dignity, which he associated with the
distinctly human ability to discern the moral law
and live by it. For Kant, dignity included not only
an obligation to respect people’s freely rendered
decisions, but also the concomitant obligation not
to interfere with them by treating people as objects
of another’s free will. In the context of clinical ethics, the principle of respect for autonomy and the
related requirement of informed consent aim to
address this aspect of human dignity.
Importantly, not all patients in the ICU have
the same degree of cognitive capacity or even the
same interest in making decisions about their care.
Many ICU patients intermittently or permanently
lack decision–making capacity because they are
sedated, chemically paralyzed, or have suffered
injuries, diseases, or complications that render them
incapable of discussing, understanding, or participating in treatment decisions. Other patients may
have the ability to make decisions about their care,
but would prefer to defer decision making to their
health care team or loved one instead. Still other
patients may have the limited capacity to make
simple decisions, but insufficient ability to make
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more complex choices. For example, an ICU patient
may not have the capacity to make decisions with
irreversible consequences, such as the discontinuation of life–sustaining therapies, but she may have
the capacity to indicate preferences about where
intravenous lines are placed or when she wants
to receive personal care and by whom. Respecting
patients’ autonomy—much like respecting their
personal narratives—therefore requires attention
to the uniqueness of each patient.
In this context, an inquiry is necessary to learn the
extent to which a particular patient has the capacity
and desire to exercise autonomy. A variety of tools are
available to clinicians to assess a patient’s decision–
making capacity (Appelbaum, 2007; Chow, Czarny,
Hughes, & Carrese, 2010). These evaluations, which
should be a routine part of ICU care, offer clinicians
not only an opportunity to examine a patient’s ability
to understand, reason, and communicate a choice,
but can also provide insight into the values underlying a patient’s preferences.
Conversations that build trust between clinicians, patients, and (where appropriate) moral surrogates who serve as designated decision makers
for patients, are a related and vital step to providing care that respects patients’ autonomy. In these
discussions, clinicians should ask about patients’
personal narratives (e.g., their values and their life
before their ICU admission) and their expectations
for life after they leave the ICU. Clinicians should
also inquire and document whether patients have
advance directives and a designated health care
agent to speak and make treatment decisions for
them when they are unable to do so. Collectively,
these conversations create a space to discuss treatment options with honesty and candor,3 but also in
a manner sensitive to patients’ preferences.

3. Respecting self–determination requires presenting
patients and their moral surrogates with all medically viable
choices. However, creating the illusion of choice when there
is no real choice—for example, by offering cardiopulmonary
resuscitation in the ICU when the clinician knows it is
extremely unlikely to restore heartbeat or respiration—
undermines authentic patient choice.
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It is, of course, too simple to suggest that clinicians
merely need to engage patients and their moral surrogates in conversations about their care to respect their
autonomy. Respecting this aspect of patients’ dignity
also involves accepting patients’ or their moral surrogates’ informed choices, even when those choices run
counter to the clinicians’ judgment. In cases where the
choices of patients or their surrogates counter the clinician’s judgment, respecting the dignity and autonomy
of that patient might mean having more discussion
to ensure that these choices are truly informed and
autonomous or, in the case of a moral surrogate,
appropriately reflective of the patient’s values and
preferences. Although we acknowledge that there are
instances where clinicians are justified in overriding
the choices of moral surrogates and even sometimes of
patients, the moral default setting must be otherwise.
“Authentic respect” for patient autonomy means
approaching the patient encounter with a commitment not to a particular outcome, but instead to the
“process of understanding and meaning” (Rushton,
2007). It involves accepting patients for the unique
selves that they are, not speaking condescendingly
to them, and ultimately respecting their dignity by
honoring their preferences. In so doing, clinicians’
respect for a patient’s autonomy frequently overlaps with the respect owed to the patient’s shared
humanity and their personal narrative.

Conclusion
Despite its generally positive connotation in the
context of clinical care, appeals to dignity in contemporary health policy and bioethical debates
have received mixed reviews. For some commentators, dignity is a value of such “paramount
importance” (Kass, 2008, p. 298) that it should be
“a central moral and social aim . . . of everyday
medical care” (Dresser, 2008, p. 505) and the lingua
franca of a just and caring health system (Annas,
2005). For others, dignity is a concept in such
disarray that it is at best a placeholder for more
precise notions like autonomy (Macklin, 2003),
and at worst, “nothing more than a short–hand
expression for people’s moral intuitions and feelings” (Kuhse, 2000, p. 72).

The dispute over dignity’s usefulness and purpose is, in large part, a consequence of not having
a conceptual framework or a discrete context in
which discussions about dignity’s multivalent
nature can take place (Henry, 2011). The model we
offer aims to change that in the ICU setting by offering an understanding of dignity that is meaningful
for participants in that context. By highlighting the
three sources of patient dignity—shared humanity,
personal narrative, and autonomy—and the types
of respect that each requires in the ICU, the model
offers a framework for identifying and rectifying
threats to patients’ dignity in that setting. Although
the conceptual model’s most immediate contribution
is to advance scholarship about patient dignity in the
ICU, we believe the model can be effectively operationalized in clinical practice to improve patient care.
Focusing on respect and dignity, however, is only
part of the story. Most clinicians are predisposed to
respect patients’ dignity, but for a variety of reasons
may find it difficult to do so. In the ICU, clinicians,
patients, and their loved ones meet under conditions
of uncertainty, stress, and high–stakes outcomes. Literally, life and death often hang in the balance. In this
environment, clinicians may be depleted, burned out,
or experiencing moral distress, any one of which can
diminish their capacity to treat others with respect
(Rushton, Kaszniak, & Halifax, 2013a, 2013b). That
reality, coupled with the broader culture and economics of health care delivery, impact the way that
clinicians interact with patients. Incentives for professional advancement and financial remuneration,
for example, may thwart dignity–respecting care in
favor of episodic, technology–focused communication and decision–making. The model we propose
can help to identify these types of threats to patient
dignity in the ICU, but a careful analysis of how
clinician characteristics, environmental factors, and
other variables impede respect for patient dignity is
well warranted.
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